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Abstract: In this article a brief revision of the European and Portuguese Regulatory 
frameworks is made, especially in terms of the interconnection of broadband internet
services that are offered by cable operators. A formalization with two cable networks is 
presented, in order to obtain a benchmark for symmetric networks, and two scenarios: 
collusion and regulated market; are developed. This justifies the implementation of 
regulatory policies, with the establishment of caps for the interconnection tariffs, in order to 
assure a larger penetration rate of the broadband internet services and a bigger total welfare.
Keywords: Regulation, Tariffs of Interconnection, Goodwill.
Résumé: Cet article présente une révision brève de l'Européen et Portugais cadres 
Régulateurs, surtout dans les termes du interconnections de services d'Internet haut débit qui 
sont offerts par les opérateurs de câble. Une formalisation avec deux réseaux de câble est 
présentée, afin d'obtenir un benchmark pour les réseaux symétriques, avec deux scénarios: la 
connivence et le marché réglé. Ceci justifie l'implémentation de politiques régulatrices, avec 
l'établissement de caps pour les tarifs de interconnections, afin d'assurer un plus grand taux 
de pénétration des services d'Internet haut débit et un plus grand bien-être total.
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21. INTRODUCTION
The reality of the cable television industry, in Portugal, serves as 
starting point for the presentation of a regulation proposal that states the 
development of interconnection schemes between two cable operators 
(incumbent, and entrant), especially in the access to the broadband 
internet services.
The main contribution of the present article is a formalization that 
considers a scenario of interconnection, which is applied to networks of 
cable operators, as well as, the presentation of a proposal with regulatory 
guidelines related to tariffs of interconnection and prices of the broadband 
internet services.  
In this article, we aim to expand the literature about interconnection, 
through an application to the cable television industry (to the moment, not 
regulated, in a competitive way, in Portugal). Furthermore, we aim to
reveal the effects of the inclusion of some asymmetry, in terms of the
consumers' demand, the total welfare, and the drawing of regulatory 
policies.  
In the second section, the European and Portuguese regulatory 
frameworks are reviewed. In the third section, a model is formalized with 
a benchmark scenario of symmetric networks, and the tariffs of 
bidirectional access are presented, as well as the analysis of the welfare. 
Afterwards, an asymmetry factor in the networks is incorporated, and two 
scenarios: Collusion and Regulated Market are considered. The
implementation of regulatory procedures is suggested, in terms of the 
interconnection tariffs and the prices of the broadband internet services. 
Last, the conclusions are presented.  
32. REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
In the ambit of the European Union, the telecommunication sector has been 
demonstrating an enormous dynamism with the national regulatory authorities 
betting in the progress of the liberalization process.  
According to the Package 2002, the European instances implemented an 
outline of re-regulation of the telecommunications sector, based on a philosophy 
materialized in five fundamental directives.  
TABLE N.º 1
Regulatory Framework of Telecommunications in Europe
Authorization (authorization of networks and services of 
electronic communications – Directive 2002/20/CE).
Access (access and interconnection of networks of 
electronic communications and related resources –
Directive 2002/19/CE).
Universal Service (universal service and rights of the 
users, as regards to networks and services of electronic 
communications – Directive 2002/22/CE).
Board Directive
2002/21/CE
Privacy and Electronic Communications (treatment of 
personal data, and protection of privacy in the sector of 
electronic communications – Directive 2002/58/CE).
In the plan of the Portuguese regulatory framework, this follows a set
of orientations, where the independence, face to the economic and politic 
power, the cooperation with other European instances involved in the 
convergence process, and the promotion of self-regulation instruments 
and of co-regulation, is in consonance with the aims of the involved 
agents, and the different regulation authorities (ICS and ANACOM, 2002).   
In this field, it must be stressed the role assumed by the ICP –
ANACOM, which was instituted as independent administrative authority, 
that has administrative and supervision functions of the 
telecommunications sector. Additionally, it has several competences of 
administrative nature, conjugated with other related competences, 
namely, the development of cooperative schemes with the Government, in 
the definition of strategic guidelines and of the general politics of the 
telecommunications sector, and the supervision of the ambit of the 
operators’ activities, including the emission of specialist reports, and the 
elaboration of legislative projects, in the domain of the 
telecommunications.   
4In the domain of the interconnection of networks, the ICP -
ANACOM still has important interference powers. For example, the 
imposition of interconnection agreements, and the introduction of changes 
in the interconnection agreements that are celebrated between the 
telecommunications operators.  
  
3. REGULATION OF INTERCONNECTION: MODEL
In the literature, the problem of interconnection, given its economic
importance, has assumed a special role in the prosecution of competitive 
practices and in the drawing of regulation policies that avoid possible 
collusion practices, in the fixation of interconnection tariffs between the 
operators (Laffont and Tirole, 1994, 1996, 2000; Carter and Wright, 
1994; Armstrong, 1998, 2002; and Noam, 2001, 2002).  
In the work of Carter and Wright (2003), the competition model was 
expanded, by considering a network, with reciprocal access tariffs and 
retail prices in schemes of two part tariffs, and also by including an 
asymmetry factor in the demand.  
Taking into consideration the work of Shaked and Sutton (1982),
where it is considered the practice of product differentiation, as a suitable 
mechanism for relaxing competition, through the price, the model now
presented expands the work of Carter and Wright (2003), in a different
direction. Firstly, the benchmark result for symmetric networks is 
obtained, by considering the inexistence of horizontal differentiation of 
the product. Afterwards, the analysis is expanded trough the incorporation 
of a distortion factor on the consumers’ demand, which yields a certain 
asymmetry that is originated by the effects of the goodwill intensity
(Dorfman and Steiner, 1954; Boyer, 1974; Osório and Leitão, 2001).
3.1. Symmetric Networks
3.1.1. Tariffs of Bidirectional Access
Taking as reference the work of Shy (2001), in the formalization now 
presented, two operators initially regional monopolists that offer the
broadband internet services, are considered (Leitão, 2004). It is
considered that 2 consumers subscribe the service offered by the 
operator 1, and 2  proceed to the subscription of the service offered by 
the operator 2.   
Each cable operator of cable operates the broadband internet service in 
a certain geographic area, and also in the area operated by the other 
operator, making use of the services that are offered by the concurrent 
Internet Backbone Provider (IBP).    
5It is presupposed although, in each geographical area,  potential 
customers of high income that are available to spend H , in order to 
access the broadband internet service, and   potential consumers of low
income that are available to pay a maximum of L .  
The utility of each type of operator is obtained through the 
subscription of the service offered by the regional monopolist I, and it 
may be expressed by the following:
 0,max iHH pU   and  0,max iLL pU  
(1)
where ip  is the price of the broadband internet service that is 
requested by a consumer starting from the geographical area i.
Following Shy (2001), in the sense of establishing the maximum level 
of prices that consumers of high income are capable to support, the 
following presupposition is considered:
Presupposition 1: The consumers of high income are available to pay 
more for the broadband internet service, than the consumers of low 
income, but not more than twice. This means that LHL  2 .
In terms of tariffs of access, 
12
a corresponds to the tariff of access 
that is established by the operator 2, for any connection to the broadband 
internet service on its IBP. We suppose this connection is requested by a 
subscriber located in the geographical area covered by the network of the 
operator 2. 
In an analogous way, 
21
a  corresponds to the tariff of access that is 
established by the operator 1, for a connection to the broadband internet 
service. We also consider that this connection is requested by a 
subscriber, located in the area of the operator 1.  
The profit of each operator i (with i=1,2), obtained by the consumers' 
of the broadband internet service is given by the following:  
 

 
21
2
12
111 aqapq
, 
 

 
12
1
21
222 aqapq (2)
Where: q1 = Number of access connections to the internet requested 
by subscribers of the operator 1, and q2 = Number of access connections 
to the internet requested by subscribers of the operator 2.
6Two cable operators interact in a game, which embraces the 
development of two successive phases:
- Phase 1: Fixation of the tariffs of access: 
12
a  and 
21
a ;
- Phase 2: Simultaneous establishment of the prices of the broadband 
internet services, p1 and p2, taking the tariffs of access as given.
Each operator i is only affected by the tariff of access that is 
established by the concurrent cable operator. The utility functions of the
consumers (see (1)) imply that:
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Taking into consideration the equations presented at (2) and (3), the 
profit of the operator i is given by the following:
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In the phase 2, each cable operator i takes the tariffs of access as 
given, and he chooses the correspondent price of the broadband internet 
service, in order to assure the profit maximization. The distribution of 
prices of the broadband internet is represented in the following way:
(5)
The pricing strategies that are expressed through the expressions 
presented at (5), aim the profit maximization for the cable operator i. This
fact is justifiable through the direct comparison between the profit levels 
that are expressed at (4), where it is observed that the establishment of 
Lip  provides a higher level of profit, than when it is established at 
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7the level Hip  , since 
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The profit obtained by the cable operator i ( 'i ), through the tariffs of 
access that are established by the operator i, is equal to:
j
ji
i qa ' ; where: i, j = 1,2; and ji  . (6)
and by incorporating (3), that profit is expressed in the following way:
(7)
The operator i will choose a low value for the tariff of access,
HL
ji
a   2 , in detriment of a high value for the tariff of access,
H
ji
a  , if   HHL   ,22 , and when   LH  3/4 .
From the previous, it results the following proposition:  
Proposition 1: In a equilibrium balance of a perfect sub-game, the 
tariff of access that is established by the operator i over an access to a 
broadband internet service originated in j is given by the following:  
(8)
For the determination of the profit of each cable operator, and by 
using the pricing strategy for tariffs of access enunciated in (8), we 
substitute the obtained revenue in (4), through the use of the tariffs of 
access given in (7), and of the equilibrium price given in (5).   
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8From the previous statements the equilibrium level of profit that is 
obtained by each operator is expressed by the following:
(9)
3.1.2. Levels of total welfare
The total welfare is defined through the sum of the utilities that are 
obtained by the consumers, and of the profit levels obtained by the 
operators. In formal terms, we have that:
2122  LH UUW               (10)
Considering (9) the total welfare is expressed in different forms 
according to what is enunciated in the following Table:
TABLE N.º 2
Total Welfare, by parameter of valorisation
Parameters of 
valorisation
Total Welfare (W)
  LH  3/4  HLW   2
  LH  3/4  HW 2
In the previous Table is considered the inexistence of production 
costs. From this, it results that the tariffs of access are, merely, transfers
between the two cable operators. This way, the total welfare should equal 
the gross utility obtained by the consumers, that is, the utility obtained
before processing the prices’ reduction.
The presupposition which states that LH  2 , and the results 
presented in the previous Table, allow the definition of the following 
proposition:
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9Proposition 2: The fixation of low tariffs of access, that is, 
HL
ji
a   2 , allows to obtain a higher level of total welfare, than the 
establishment of high tariffs of access. In this sense, a market failure is 
observed, when the parameters of valorisation satisfy the condition 
  LH  3/4  (that is to say, when there is a high valorisation on the part 
of the consumers of high income). In this interval, the tariffs of access 
exceed the levels that are considered socially optimal. Therefore, the 
optimal regulatory action, in social terms, implies that the regulatory 
agency imposes a cap for the tariffs of access tariffs, at the level of 
HLa   2 , because just with this procedure it is guaranteed the access 
to the broadband internet services, from the part of the subscribers of low 
income.
The presupposition which considers that 
LH  2  and the results 
presented in the Table N.º 2 imply that the inclusion of the totality of the
consumers provides a higher total welfare. To induce the operators to the 
fixation of the price 
Lip  , instead of Hip   (see (5)), it is necessary 
that the tariffs of access don't exceed the following: 
HL
ji
a   2 .
On the contrary, when   LH  3/4  (see (8)) this implies that the 
operators establish high tariffs of access, which are considered non 
optimal, in social terms, given the economic rationale that was, 
previously, presented.  
  
3.2. Asymmetric Networks
3.2.1. Tariffs of Bidirectional Access
For modelling a scenario of asymmetric networks, we consider, as 
starting point, the formalization presented in Carter and Wright (1999, 
2003). Firstly, it is considered that a consumer of the broadband internet 
service will prefer to subscribe the service offered in the network 1 that is 
owned by the incumbent, in detriment of the network 2, which is operated 
by the entrant, since:
   mSpvmSpv ,,,,,, 222111                (11)
Where: ip  is price of the broadband internet service; iS  is the 
dimension of the network of operator i; i  are the additional benefits for 
10
belonging to the network i; m  is the net income; and .2,1i  corresponds 
to the networks of the cable operators.
The exercise of the preference depends on the dimension of the 
network  iS , of the prices of the internet service  ip  and of the 
differentiating characteristics of the network  i .
For specifying the parameter relative to the horizontal differentiation 
 i , a Hotelling formalization is used (Tirole, 1988).
As in the works of Carter and Wright (1999, 2003) and Laffont et al. 
(1998), it is presupposed that the distinction established between the two
cable operators is unidimensional. Therefore, it is considered that, the 
operators are located in opposite extremes of the unitary interval and that 
the respective consumers are distributed along that same interval. The 
benefits for the customer of the type  1,0x , for belonging to the 
network 2, they are proportional to x and may be expressed in the 
following way:
  xx  2                            (12)
Where:   Degree of importance of the competition not originated
through the price.
In the case 0 , the differential of prices assumes a special 
importance and the operator that establishes lower prices, it will win all 
the market.  
This way, the operator intends to increase progressively   in the 
sense of establishing a higher price than the rival operator without facing 
the risk of getting a reduction on its market share.  
In the present formalization, in order to allow the existence of 
asymmetry between the networks, is added one extra factor   that 
measures the benefits for belonging to the network 1 in a such way that:
      xx 11                                                        (13)
The parameter  results from the accumulated preferences of the 
consumers, which, for its turn, are originated from the long term 
advertising (Nerlove and Arrow, 1962). 
This parameter represents the loyalty of the consumers and it results 
from the allocation of the goodwill advertising that contributes to the 
edification of entry barriers, and to the increase of the limit-price (Boyer, 
1974).  
11
In this context, it is considered a simple formalization, where the 
demand for the broadband internet service is dependent of the stock of 
accumulated goodwill, which is affected according to the levels of 
investment in advertising along the phases of the life cycle of the 
enterprise (Osório and Leitão, 2001). 
For simplifying the current analysis, and since we consider that the 
spatial distribution of the operators is unidimensional, we derive the 
following presupposition:  
Presupposition 2: The degree of asymmetry degree between the 
networks    assumes values between 0 and 1. If 0 , then the 
networks are symmetric. For its turn, if 1 , with identical prices, then 
we admit that the consumers of the type 1x will prefer to subscribe 
the broadband internet service that is offered in the network 1.  
  
For a consumer of the type x  it will be indifferent to opt among the 
two networks in the case of verifying the following:
   mxSpvmxSpv ,,,,,,,, 2211                (14)
For example, in the simplest case, when x is distributed, uniformly, in 
[0, 1], the market share of the network 1 (S1) is given by xS 1 . The 
additional specification depends of the fact of being possible, or not, to 
provide mechanisms of interconnection between the two networks.
3.2.2. Interconnection with asymmetry
By assuming a uniform distribution of x, the market share of the 
network is equal to: 

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casecontrarytheinx
xif
xif
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             (15)
Solving (14) in order to x , the following is obtained:
    mxSpvmxSpv ,,,,,,,, 2211 
        2/)()(2/2/1 21 ppx                          (16)
From the analysis of the result obtained in (16) it is straightforward that:
(i) If the degree of asymmetry between the networks (expressed by the 
goodwill intensity) is equal to 0 (that is, if 0 ), and if the networks 
12
establish identical prices ( 21 pp  ), then each network will reach, 
exactly, half of the market, that is,  2/1x ;
(ii) If the degree of asymmetry expresses an effective loyalty in relation to 
a certain brand (that is, if 0 ), that is, a more inelastic final demand, 
then the network 1 (the incumbent one) will reach a market share bigger 
than 50%;  
(iii) If the degree of importance of the competition not originated through 
the price    assume extreme values that tend to  , then the network 1
will obtain a market share bigger than 50%, which is expressed by:
   2/2/1 x  (with 0 ).
3.2.3. Levels of Total Welfare
In the determination of the total profits, the following presuppositions 
are considered:
Presupposition 3: Given the valorisation attributed by the consumers 
to the accumulated brand image by the incumbent, and the importance of 
the competition not originated through the price, the network 1 reaches a 
market share that is equal to:    2/2/1 x .
Presupposition 4: Considering a scenario that contemplates the 
celebration of an interconnection agreement with the fixation of 
reciprocal tariffs of interconnection:
HL
jiij
aa    2 , the 
valorisation attributed to the incumbent network 1 allows to setting a 
higher price  Hp 1 . For its turn, the entrant network opts to establish 
a lower price  Lp 2 , in order to increase its market share.
In the situation of asymmetric networks, the profit function of the 
network 1 is now expressed by the following:
 

 
21
2
12
111 aqapq     HLLH   2121
where:  2/  .
                              (17)
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In the same situation, the profit function of the network 2 corresponds 
to the following:
 

 
12
1
21
222 aqapq     HLLH   212
Where:  2/  .
            (18)
The sum of the total profits of the operators is equal to:
  LLH   21              (19)
and the total welfare (W) is expressed by the following:
 2122 LH UUW     LLHW   2
                           (20)
Comparing with the benchmark result for symmetric networks that 
was, previously, presented in Table N.º 2, when   LH  3/4 , the 
following Lemma may be derived:  
  
Lemma 1: With the inclusion of a degree of asymmetry in the 
demand, through the product differentiation originated by the 
accumulated stock of goodwill owned by the incumbent, the total welfare
is dependent of the valorisation attributed by the consumers (expressed by
 ), and of the disposition to pay, from the part of the consumers of high 
income  H . Taking into consideration that 2/  , the bigger 
the weight of the accumulated preferences of the consumers, for 
belonging to the incumbent network 1, the bigger will be the disposition 
to pay, from the part of the consumers of high income and, by 
consequence, the bigger will be the total welfare.
3.3. Scenarios
3.3.1. Scenario 1: Collusion
Considering now a scenario of asymmetric networks where the 
operators, in the celebration of the interconnection agreement, decide to 
collude. This way, we consider the following:  
Presupposition 5: In the fixation of reciprocal interconnection tariffs:
H
jiij
aa   , the incumbent network 1 establishes a higher price 
 Hp 1 , given the high valorisation attributed to its broadband internet 
14
service. For its turn, the entrant network 2 establishes a lower price 
 Lp 2 , given its reduced accumulated stock of goodwill.
In the collusive scenario, the profit function of the network 1 is given
by the following:
     HHH  2/12/1    H 11
Where:  2/  .
             (21)
The profit function of the network 2 is given by the following:
      HHH  2/2/12  H 2
Where:  2/  .
                  (22)
The sum of the total profits obtained by the operators is the following:
H 21              (23)
and the total welfare comes equal to:
HLH WUUW   2122              (24)
Comparing with the result obtained in (20), in the collusive scenario, 
we consider the following:  
  
Lemma 2: The fixation of higher tariffs of access


   H
jiij
aa 
harms the total welfare. Furthermore, it makes the total welfare
completely dependent of the disposition to pay of the consumers of high 
income, which results in a non-socially desirable situation of total 
exclusion of the consumers with low income, in what concerns the access 
to broadband internet.
3.3.2. Scenario 2: Regulated Market
The arguments previously presented make necessary to design a 
scenario of regulated market, with the aim of disseminate the access to 
broadband internet services, trough the cable network. This is also a good 
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example of a possible expansion of the ambit of the denominated 
universal service of telecommunications. For this effect, it is considered 
the following presupposition:
  
Presupposition 6: The regulatory agency imposes that the tariffs of 
interconnection don't exceed the level expressed by:
HL
jiij
aa    2 ; and that the prices of the broadband internet 
service are equal, that is: Lpp  21 . This aims to increase the 
dissemination of broadband internet service, from the part of all types of 
consumers (that is, low and high income).  
In the situation of regulated market, the profit function of the network
1 is expressed by the following:  
    HLLH   211             
Where:  2/  .
             (25)
In the same situation, the profit function of the network 2 is given by:
    HLLH   212                           (26)
Now, the sum of the total profits is given by the following:
L 21              (27)
and the total welfare is expressed by:
  LLHW   2              (28)
In a scenario of asymmetric networks, and comparing with the level of 
total welfare, obtained at (20), we are able to state that the regulatory 
action should establish caps for the tariffs of 
interconnection 

   HL
jiij
aa 2 , since this procedure guarantees
the maximization of the total welfare.  
In what concerns to the regulation of prices, and incorporating the 
Presupposition 3, which expresses the asymmetry induced on demand 
through the accumulated stock of goodwill, we stress the fact that the 
regulatory agency should let the market to operate, in a free way.  
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The inclusion of a distortion factor on the demand for services 
provided by the incumbent operator, through the incorporation of the 
effect associated with the goodwill intensity, results in a larger total 
welfare (see (20)). Nevertheless, this is conditioned by the valorisation 
attributed by the consumers, as well as, by the weight of the preferences 
revealed by the subscribers, of high income, in what concerns the 
incumbent network. These preferences are originated through the 
goodwill, which contributes to a largest disposition to pay for the 
services, from the part of the consumers. The incumbent develops 
mechanisms of horizontal differentiation, in order to relax the competition 
through the price, and to reach a bigger market share.  
The regulation should promote the celebration of interconnection 
agreements, by establishing caps for the tariffs of interconnection, and by 
avoiding potential situations of collusion, in order to eliminate the 
possible exploitation of joint monopoly power, from the part of vertically 
integrated firms. As regards to the fixation of prices of access to the 
broadband internet service, through cable network, the market should be 
adjusted, in a free way. This will assure, on the one hand, the inclusion of 
the subscribers of high income, and on the other hand, the maximization 
of the total welfare. In this sense, it is fundamental to revitalize the 
philosophies of pro-competitive regulatory actions, in order to assure the 
interconnection between the networks, and to expand the ambit of the 
universal service of telecommunications, through the addition of a 
strategic item for the economic growth of the nations, that is, the 
universal access to the broadband internet services.
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